Voters making a binary decision purchase votes from a centralized clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased. The net payoff to an agent with utility u who purchases v votes is Ψ(S n+1 )u − v 2 , where Ψ is a monotone function taking values between -1 and +1 and S n+1 is the sum of all votes purchased by the n + 1 voters participating in the election. The utilities of the voters are assumed to arise by random sampling from a probability distribution F U with compact support; each voter knows her own utility, but not those of the other voters, although she does know the sampling distribution F U . Nash equilibria for this game are described. These results imply that the expected inefficiency of any Nash equilibrium decays like 1/n.
Introduction

Quadratic voting
The principle of one man, one vote (or perhaps we should say one person, one vote, or one shareholder, one vote) has been a cornerstone of democratic institutions since antiquity. But although it is the most equitable way of distributing influence in group decision-making, it has obvious drawbacks, perhaps the most notable being the tyranny of the majority and the noise of the rabble. It is often the case that a minority of a population have a much greater stake in the outcome of an election than the majority (consider, for instance, the issue of gay marriage, where the economic and social costs of prohibition to gays can be orders of magnitude higher than the social costs accruing to those opposed to legalization); in such cases one-person-one-vote elections will often lead to outcomes at variance with the aggregate social utility. Related to this problem of tyranny of the majority is the distinct problem of the noise of the rabble, which occurs when such a large fraction of the voting population has so little at stake -or such a poor understanding of the consequences of the choice being made -that their votes are essentially random. In such cases, the magnitude of the "noise" can be so large that it overwhelms the "signal" in the votes of the much smaller minority of voters who are well-informed, or have a real stake in the outcome.
Various alternatives to one-person-one-vote democracy have been discussed in the economics literature (see the forthcoming paper [6] for a detailed discussion and bibliography). Recently, a simple mechanism designed to eliminate some of the problems that arise in one-person-one-vote democracy, Quadratic Voting, has been proposed by Weyl [11] (in part motivated by earlier work of Hylland and Zeckhauser [5] ) and advocated by Posner and Weyl [8] for use in corporate governance (see also [7] and [3] ). In quadratic voting, voters making a binary decision purchase votes from a centralized clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased. The ultimate payoff to the voter is her utility minus the cost of the votes she purchases, in the event that her side wins the election, or minus the cost of her votes in the event that her side loses.
It is not our purpose in this paper to discuss the relative advantages (and disadvantages) of quadratic voting or its competitors -this will be done in a subsequent article. Rather, the intent of this article is to elucidate the mathematical properties of the mechanism, in particular, the structure of the (Bayes-)Nash equilibria in a quadratic voting game modeled on the Weyl proposal.
Assumptions
In this game there are n + 1 agents, whose utilities U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n+1 are gotten by independent random sampling from a probability distribution F U on R with mean µ U ≥ 0, variance σ 2 U > 0, and with C ∞ density f U (u) supported by a closed interval [−A, B] containing the point 0. (In particular, we assume that f U is C ∞ in the interior (−A, B), and that f U and all of its derivatives extend continuously to [−A, B].) To avoid pathologies, we shall assume that f U is strictly positive, and therefore bounded below, on [−A, B]. The distribution F U is known to the agents, as is the sample size n + 1, but the actual values U i of the other voters are not. Agents buy votes subject to the quadratic cost rule: to buy ±v votes, an agent must pay v 2 . The payoff to an agent i with utility U i who purchases V i votes is
where S n+1 = n+1 j=1 V j is the sum of all votes purchased by the n + 1 agents. Here Ψ : R → [−1, 1] is a nondecreasing, C ∞ function 1 whose derivative ψ(x) := Ψ ′ (x) satisfies the following conditions:
(a) ψ has support [−δ, δ]; and (b) ψ/2 is a strictly positive probability density on [−δ, δ].
Thus, in particular, the payoff function Ψ is identically 1 on [δ, ∞) and identically −1 on (−∞, δ] and is strictly increasing on [−δ, δ]. In Theorem 7 (sec. 5) we will require in addition that Ψ is odd, but this is not necessary for any of the other main results. Agents are assumed to be rational, and so an agent will always buy votes of the same sign (±) as her utility, and 1 A better model for many elections might be the function Ψ = 1 (0,∞) − 1 (−∞,0) , which has a jump discontinuity at 0 and so is not C ∞ . The hypothesis in this paper that Ψ is infinitely differentiable is primarily for the sake of mathematical tractability. However, it can be argued that smoothed versions of the payoff function make sense on economic grounds, as well, at least in some contexts, since (for instance) in nearly tied elections there will be the possibility of recounts, litigation, etc. no agent will pay more for votes than 2|u|, where u is the voter's utility, since 2|u| is the maximum change in utility payoff that could possibly result. ; when a mixed strategy π V is adopted, each agent i will buy a random number V i of votes, where V 1 , V 2 , . . . are conditionally independent given the utilities U 1 , U 2 , . . . and V i has conditional distribution π V (U i ). Clearly, the set of mixed strategies contains the pure strategies.
Terminology
A best response for an agent with utility u to a strategy (either pure or mixed) is a value v such that
where S n is the sum of the votes of the other n agents when these agents all play the specified strategy and E denotes expectation. (Thus, under E, the random variables V i of the n other voters are distributed in accordance with the strategy and the sampling rule for utility values U i described above.) Since Ψ is continuous and bounded, the equation (2) and the dominated convergence theorem imply that for each u the set of best responses is closed, and hence has well-defined maximal and minimal elements v + (u), v − (u).
A mixed strategy π V is a Nash equilibrium if for every u ∈ [−A, B] the measure π V (u) is supported by the set of best responses to π V for an agent with utility u.
Main Results
The existence of Nash equilibria is guaranteed by general existence theorems in game theory, for instance those of Athey [1] , or alternatively those of Reny [9] , [10] . Details can be found in the forthcoming paper [6] . Nash equilibria need not be unique, as we will show, nor are they necessarily pure strategies. However, every Nash equilibrium is "essentially" a pure strategy, as the following theorem implies.
Theorem 1. If a mixed strategy π V is a Nash equilibrium, then the set of utility values u ∈ [−A, B]
for which there is more than one best response (and hence the set of values u such that π V (u) is not supported by just a single point v(u)) is at most countable.
Since by hypothesis the utility values U i are sampled from a distribution F U that is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, it follows that for every Nash equilibrium there is an equivalent pure-strategy Nash equilibrium v(u). 2 The space of Borel probability measures on [− √ 2A, √ 2B] is given the topology of weak convergence; Borel measurability of a function with range Π is relative to the Borel field induced by this topology. Theorem 1 below implies that in the quadratic voting game only pure strategies are relevant, so measurability issues will play no role in this paper. The main results of the paper, to which we now turn, concern the nature of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. First, we will prove that in all cases Nash equilibria are nearly linear functions, except in the extreme tails of the utility distribution.
Theorem 3.
For any ǫ > 0 there exist constants n ǫ < ∞ and C < ∞ such that if n ≥ n ǫ then for any Nash equilibrium v(u) and for all
Furthermore, for all sufficiently large n any Nash equilibrium v(u) with no discontinuities must satisfy
Thus, except for agents with extreme utilities, the number of votes v(u) that will be purchased will be roughly proportional to the agent's utility u, with proportionality constant Eψ(S n ). The size of this proportionality constant will vary from order 1/n to 1/n 1/4 , depending on the properties of the utility distribution and the payoff function Ψ. There are two main cases, depending on whether the mean µ U of the utility distribution is zero or non-zero; the case where the mean is non-zero splits into two sub-cases, depending on the relative "steepness" of the payoff function. Recall that Ψ is strictly increasing on the interval [−δ, δ] and flat on both [δ, ∞) and (−∞, −δ].
Theorem 4. Assume that
then for each ǫ > 0 and all sufficiently large values of the sample size n, (i) no Nash equilibrium has a discontinuity; and (ii) for every Nash equilibrium, P {|S n − δ| ≥ ǫ} < ǫ.
In conjunction with Theorem 3, this implies that for large n the proportionality constant in (3) will be approximately Eψ(S n ) ≈ n −1 δ/(2µ U ). This yields the following rough description of a Nash equilibrium when n is large: every agent will buy about δu/(2nµ U ) votes, where u is her utility; since the mean µ U is positive, the law of large numbers will guarantee that the vote total will be near δ. One might wonder why those agents with negative utility values would purchase votes at all, since they will, with overwhelmingly high probability, lose the election. The answer is that Ψ is strictly increasing on [−δ, δ], and so the expected payoff for an agent with negative utility is slightly increased by a small move of the vote total to the left.
The case where µ U > 0 and there exists w ∈ [−δ, δ] such that (1 − Ψ(w))A > (δ − w) 2 is more interesting, but has several wrinkles that must be ironed out before a characterization of Nash equilibria can be given. If such a w exists, then there exists α > δ such that
2 and (4)
For a given payoff function Ψ and A > 0 there might exist several pairs (α, w) for which the conditions (4) hold. However, for generic Ψ and A there will be only one such pair, and at this pair the second derivative of (α − w ′ ) 2 + Ψ(w ′ )A with respect to w ′ will be positive:
This is the only sub-case of (4) that we will consider.
Theorem 5.
Assume that µ U > 0 and that there is a unique pair (α, w) satisfying (4) and (5) .
Then there exists γ > 0 such that for any ǫ > 0, all sufficiently large values of the sample size n, and any Nash equilibrium v(u),
Under the hypotheses of Theorem 5 Nash equilibria are not unique, for a trivial reason: any Nash equilibrium v has a discontinuity u * , and both the left limit v(u * −) and the right limit v(u * +) are best responses at u * , so a Nash equilibrium can be obtained by setting v(u * ) to either (or to any convex combination, for a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium). The case considered in Theorem 5 is especially interesting, in that the Nash equilibria are driven by the possible presence in the sample of an extremist (an agent with utility u < −A + γn −2 ) who will singlehandedly buy the election. Such an agent will occur only with probability ≈ n −1 f U (−A)γ, and so will affect the expected payoff to a non-extremist by an amount of order only 1/n, but this is enough for a non-extremist to push her vote purchase to the point where the aggregate vote of the non-extremists in the sample will be near the point α where only agents in the 1/n 2 tail would find it beneficial to use the extremist strategy.
The case µ U = 0, where the utility distribution is (at least in a crude sense) balanced is more technically challenging, and here we have less complete results. First, there are no extremists and no discontinuities. 
Under additional hypotheses, the proportionality constant in (3) is of order n −1/4 , as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 7.
Assume that the function ψ = Ψ ′ is even. If µ U = 0 and EU 3 = 0 then for any ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large then every Nash equilibrium satisfies
and therefore, by the proportionality rule (3) , for all u = 0,
We do not know if the hypotheses that ψ is even and EU 3 = 0 are necessary for the validity of the theorem. The proof of the theorem, in section 5 below, will use the Edgeworth expansion for the density of a sum of independent, identically distributed random variables (cf. Feller [2] , Ch. XVI, sec. 2, Th. 2), and in order that the relevant terms in this expansion behave in the desired fashion we must have EU 3 = 0 and ψ even.
The rest of the article is arranged as follows. In section 2, we prove Theorems 1 and 2, and we establish a necessary condition for a pure-strategy to be a Nash equilibrium. In section 3, we use the necessary condition to prove that pure-strategy Nash equilibria must be continuous and smooth except in small neighborhoods of the endpoints −A, B, and we prove the approximate proportionality rule (Theorem 3). Finally, we prove Theorems 4 and 5 in section 4, and Theorem 7 in section 5.
Necessary Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Let π V be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, and let S n be the sum of the votes of n agents with utilities U i gotten by random sampling from F u , all acting in accordance with the strategy π V . For an agent with utility u, a best response v must satisfy equation (2) , and so in particular for every ∆ > 0, if u > 0 then
Similarly, if u < 0 and ∆ > 0 then
Since Ψ is C ∞ and its derivative ψ has compact support, differentiation under the expectation if permissible. Thus, we have the following necessary condition.
Proposition 2.1. If π V is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium then for every u a best response v must satisfy
Consequently, every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium v(u) must satisfy the functional equation Proof. It is obvious that the only best response for an agent with u = 0 is v = 0, and the monotonicity of the payoff function Ψ implies that a best response v for an agent with utility u must be of the same sign as u. If v,ṽ are best responses for agents with utilities 0 ≤ u <ũ, then by definition
and so, after re-arrangement of terms,
Hence,
The monotonicity of Ψ implies that if 0 ≤ṽ < v then EΨ(ṽ + S n ) ≤ EΨ(v + S n ), and so it follows that the two expectations must be equal, sinceũ−u > 0. But if the two expectations were equal then v could not possibly be a best response at u, because an agent with utility u could obtain the same expected payoff EΨ(v + S n )u at a lower vote cost by purchasing v votes. This proves that if 0 ≤ u <ũ then best responses v,ṽ for agents with utilities u,ũ must satisfy 0 ≤ v ≤ṽ. A similar argument shows that if u <ũ ≤ 0 then best responses v,ṽ for agents with utilities u,ũ must satisfy v ≤ṽ ≤ 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. For each u denote by v − (u) and v + (u) the minimal and maximal best responses at u. Proposition 2.2 implies that if u <ũ then v + (u) ≤ v − (ũ). Consequently, for any ǫ > 0 the set of utilities values u at which
which is impossible since best responses must take values between − √ 2A and √ 2B.
Remark 2.3. It follows from Theorem 1 that a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is essentially equivalent to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, specifically, the pure strategy v(u) = v − (u). This is because by hypothesis the sampling distribution F U is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, and so with probability one the sample U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n+1 will contain only values u at which v − (u) = v + (u). This proves the second assertion of Theorem 2.
Henceforth, we shall consider only pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Since the utility density f U (u) is strictly positive on [−A, B], it follows that there is positive probability p that every agent in the sample casts vote V i = 0. But then an agent with utility u could improve her expectation by buying ε > 0 votes, where ε ≪ uψ(0)p, because then the expected utility gain would be at least
at a cost of ε 2 . Since by hypothesis ψ(0) > 0, the expected utility gain would overwhelm the increased vote cost for small ε > 0.
Corollary 2.5. Any Nash equilibrium v(u) is strictly monotone on [−A, B].
Proof. Propositions 2.1 and 2.4 imply that Eψ(S n + v(u)) > 0 for every u = 0. Now differentiation of the necessary condition (12) gives
at every u where v(u) is differentiable. Since such points are dense in [−A, B], and since ψ and ψ ′ are C ∞ functions with compact support, it follows that v ′ (u) = 0 on a dense set. But v ′ (u) ≥ 0 at every point where the derivative exists, so it follows that v ′ (u) > 0 almost everywhere, and this implies that v is strictly monotone.
Continuity and Smoothness Properties of Nash Equilibria
Weak consensus bounds
According to the necessary condition (12), in a Nash equilibrium the number of votes v(u) purchased by an agent with utility u must satisfy the equation
It is natural to expect that when the sample size n + 1 is large the effect of adding a single vote v to the aggregate total S n should be small, and so the function v(u) should satisfy the approximate proportionality rule
As we will show later, this naive approximation can fail badly for utility values u in the extreme tails of the distribution F U , and even in the bulk of the distribution the relative error in the approximation can be significant. Nevertheless, the idea of approximate population consensus on the expectations Eψ(v(u) + S n ) can be used to obtain weak bounds that we will find useful. The following lemma states, roughly, that if it is optimal for some agent in the bulk of the population to buy a moderately large number of votes, then most agents will be forced to buy a moderately large number of votes.
Lemma 3.1. For every ǫ > 0 there exist constants α, β > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n and any Nash equilibrium v(u)
Proof. It suffices to establish the lower bound αv(B − ǫ) − e −βn , as the other half of (13) can be proved in virtually the same way. Set u ǫ = B − ǫ and p ǫ = 1 − F U (u ǫ ) where F U is the cumulative distribution function of the utility distribution. Let N = N ǫ be the number of points in the sample U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n that fall in the interval [B − ǫ, B], and let U = U n+1 be independent of U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n . Then
Now conditional on N = m, the sample U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n is obtained by choosing m points at random according to the conditional distribution of U given U ≥ u ǫ and n − m according to the conditional distribution of U given U < u ǫ . Consequently, for each m ≥ 0,
Furthermore, for any small ǫ ′ > 0 and for m in the range
is between 1/2 and 2. Since the binomial-(n, p ǫ ) distribution puts only an exponentially small (in n) mass outside the interval [np ǫ −nǫ ′ , np ǫ +nǫ ′ ], it follows that for some constants α ′ , β ′ depending on ǫ but not n,
for all sufficiently large n.
A similar argument proves that for suitable constants α ′′ , β ′′ > 0, and for any interval
To see this, let N be the number of points in the sample U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n that fall in the inter-
, and let N ′ be the number of points in the sample that fall in J. Decompose the conditional expectations
to the values of N and N ′ , and use the identity
As in the proof of (14), the ratio
is near one for all pairs (m, m ′ ) except those in the tails of the joint distribution, and the tails are exponentially small, by standard estimates for the multinomial distribution. Now recall that any Nash equilibrium v(u) is monotone, and satisfies the necessary condition 2v(u) = Eψ(v(u) + S n )u. Since any u > 2ǫ is the right endpoint of an interval J = [u − ǫ, u] of length ǫ for which the ratio of the right to the left endpoint is less than 2, it follows that for any such u,
and similarly for any u < −2ǫ. The assertion (13) now follows from another application of the necessary condition (12).
Concentration and size constraints
Since the vote total S n is the sum of independent, identically distributed random variables v(U i ) (albeit with unknown distribution), its distribution is subject to concentration restrictions, such as those imposed by the following lemma. 
and therefore
We will deduce Proposition 3.2 from the following general fact about sums of independent, identically distributed random variables. 
then for every interval J ⊂ R of length δ or greater, the sum
The proof of the proposition, a routine exercise in the use of Fourier methods, is relegated to the appendix.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Lemma 3.1 implies that there are constants α, β > 0 such that for every u ∈ [−A, B]\[−2ǫ, 2ǫ] the ratio v(u)/u is at least αv(u ǫ )−e −βn , where u ǫ = B−ǫ. Since the utility density f U is bounded below, it follows that for a suitable constant 0 < C < ∞,
Similarly, there exists an interval [u * , u * * ] ⊂ [−A, 0] of probability p such that
Let N be the number of points U i in the sample
, and let S * n be the sum of the votes v(U i ) for those agents whose utility values fall in this range. Observe that N has the binomial-(n, 2p) distribution, and that conditional on the event N = m and S n − S * n = w, the random variable S * n is the sum of m independent random variables Y i whose variance is at least v(u ′ ) 2 /4 and whose third moment obeys the restriction (67) (this follows from the inequalities (21)- (22)). Consequently, by Proposition 3.3, if v(u ǫ ) √ n is sufficiently large then the conditional probability, given N = n ≥ np and S n − S * n = w, that S * n lies in any interval of length δ is bounded above by ǫ/2. Since P {N ≤ np} is, for large n, much less than ǫ/2, the inequality (17) follows. Proposition 3.2 implies that for any ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large then for any Nash equilibrium v(u) the absolute value |v(u)| can assume large values only at utility values u within distance ǫ of one of the endpoints −A, B. The following proposition improves this to the extreme tails of the distribution. Proposition 3.4. For any 0 < C < ∞ there exists C ′ > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n and any Nash equilibrium v(u) satisfies the inequality
Proof. Fix C > 0, and suppose that 2v(u * ) ≥ C for some u * > 0. Since any Nash equilibrium v is monotone, we must have 2v(u) ≥ C for all u ≥ u * , and by the necessary condition (12) it follows that
Consequently, the distribution of S n is concentrated: since the function ψ has support [−δ, δ], the probability that S n + v(u) ∈ [−δ, δ] must be at least C/B ψ ′ ∞ . Thus, Proposition 3.2 implies that for any ǫ > 0 there exists γ ǫ > 0 (depending on both ǫ and C, but not on n) such that
In particular, for all sufficiently large n,
for a constant C B/2 < ∞ that may depend on B/2 and C but not on either n or the particular Nash equilibrium.
Fix C ′ large, and suppose that 2v(u * ) ≥ C for u * = B − C ′ n −3/2 . Let N * be the number of points U i in the sample U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n that fall in the interval [u * , B]; by our assumptions concerning the sampling procedure, the random variable N * has the binomial distribution with mean
where C f is the mean value of f U on the interval [u * , B] (which for large n will be close to f U (B) > 0). Since EN * is vanishingly small for large n, the assumption v(u * ) ≥ C implies that
This expectation can be decomposed by partitioning the probability space into the event G = {U n ∈ [−A + ǫ, B − ǫ]} and its complement. On the event G, the contribution of v(U n ) to the vote total S n is at most γ ǫ / √ n in absolute value, by (25). On the complementary event G c the integrand is bounded above by ψ ∞ . Therefore,
where ǫ ′ > 0 can be made arbitrarily small by choosing ǫ > 0 small and n large. This together with inequality (27) implies that for large n,
Now consider the conditional distribution of S n given that N * = 1: this can be simulated by generating S n−1 from the conditional distribution of S n−1 given that N * = 0 and then adding an independent v(U ) where U = U n is drawn from the conditional distribution of U given that U ≥ u * . Consequently, by inequality (28),
But this implies that
For large C ′ this is incompatible with inequality (26) when n is sufficiently large.
Discontinuities
Since any Nash equilibrium v(u) is monotone in the utility u, it can have at most countably many discontinuities. Moreover, since any Nash equilibrium is bounded in absolute value by 2 max(A, B) (as no agent will pay more for votes than she could gain in expected utility) the sum of the jumps is bounded by 2 max(A, B). We will now show that there is a lower bound on the size of |v| at a discontinuity. Proof. The necessary condition (12) holds at all u ′ in a neighborhood of u, so by monotonicity of v and continuity of ψ, the equation (12) must hold when v(u) is replaced by either of v ± , that is,
Subtracting one equation from the other and using the differentiability of ψ we obtain
The result then follows from the mean value theorem of calculus.
Proposition 3.6.
There is a constant ∆ > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n, at any point u of discontinuity of a Nash equilibrium,
Consequently, there is a constant β < ∞ not depending on the sample size n such that for all sufficiently large n no Nash equilibrium v(u) has a discontinuity at a point u at distance greater than βn −3/2 from one of the endpoints −A, B.
Proof. Since the function ψ has support contained in the interval [−δ, δ], equation (29) implies that v can have a discontinuity only if the distribution of S n is highly concentrated: specifically,
.
In fact, since ψ ′ vanishes at the endpoints of [−δ, δ], there exists 0 < δ ′ < δ such that
. But v(u) must satisfy the necessary condition (12) at all such u, so
Since the function ψ is positive and bounded away from 0 in any interval [−δ ′′ , δ ′′ ] where 0 < δ ′′ < δ, it follows from (32) that for sufficiently large n,
Thus, by the monotonicity of Nash equilibria, at every point u of discontinuity we must have (30). Proposition 3.4 now implies that any such discontinuities can occur only within a distance βn −3/2 of one of the endpoints −A, B.
Smoothness
Since Nash equilibria are monotone, by Proposition 2.2, they are necessarily differentiable almost everywhere. We will show that in fact differentiability must hold at every u, except near the endpoints −A, B.
Lemma 3.7. If v(u) is a Nash equilibrium then at every u where v is differentiable,
Proof. This is a routine consequence of the necessary condition (12) and the smoothness of the function ψ.
Equation (33) can be rewritten as a first-order differential equation:
This differential equation becomes singular at any point where the denominator approaches 0, but is regular in any interval where Eψ ′ (S n + v(u))u ≤ 1. The following lemma implies that this will be the case on any interval where |v(u)| remains sufficiently small. , and all n,
Proof. Recall that ψ/2 is a C ∞ probability density with support [−δ, δ] and such that ψ is strictly positive in the open interval (−δ, δ). Consequently, on any interval J ⊂ (−δ, δ) where |ψ ′ | (or |ψ ′′ |) is bounded below by a positive number, so is ψ.
Fix ǫ > 0 so small that ǫ max(−A, B) < α/2. In order that E|ψ ′ (ṽ + S n )u| ≥ α, it must be the case that the event {|ψ ′ (ṽ + S n )| ≥ ǫ} contributes at least α/2 to the expectation; hence,
But on this event the random variable ψ(ṽ + S n ) is bounded below by a positive number η = η ǫ , so it follows that (−A, B) .
A similar argument proves the corresponding result for ψ ′′ .
Proposition 3.9.
There exist constants C, α > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n, any Nash equilibrium v(u) is continuously differentiable on any interval where |v(u)| ≤ C (and therefore, by Proposition 3.4, on (−A + C ′ n −3/2 , B − C ′ n −3/2 )), and the derivative satisfies
Proof. The function v(u) is differentiable almost everywhere, by Proposition 2.2, and at every point u where v(u) is differentiable the differential equation (34) holds. By Proposition 3.6, the sizes of discontinuities are bounded below, and so if C > 0 is sufficiently small then a Nash equilibrium v(u) can have no discontinuities on any interval where |v(u)| ≤ C. Similar arguments show that Nash equilibria have derivatives of higher orders provided the sample size is sufficiently large. The proof of Theorem 7 in section 5 will require information about the second derivative v ′′ (u). This can be obtained by differentiating under the expectations in (34):
(37) A repetition of the proof of Proposition 3.9 now shows that for suitable constants C, β > 0 and all sufficiently large n, any Nash equilibrium v(u) is twice continuously differentiable on any interval where |v(u)| ≤ C and satisfies the inequalities
Approximate proportionality
The information that we now have about the form of Nash equilibria can be used to sharpen the heuristic argument given in paragraph 3.1 to support the "approximate proportionality rule". Recall that in a Nash equilibrium the number of votes v(u) purchased by an agent with utility u must satisfy the equation 2v(u) = Eψ(v(u) + S n )u. We have shown in Proposition 3.4 that for any Nash equilibrium, v(u) must be small except in the extreme tails of the distribution (in particular, for all u at distance much more than n −3/2 from both endpoints −A, B). Since ψ is uniformly continuous, it follows that the expectation Eψ(v(u) + S n ) cannot differ by very much from Eψ(S n ).
Unfortunately, this argument only shows that the approximation 2v(u) ≈ Eψ(S n )u is valid up to an error of size ǫ n |u| where ǫ n → 0 as n → ∞. However, as n → ∞ the expectation Eψ(S n ) → 0, and so the error in the approximation above might be considerably larger than the approximation itself. Theorem 3 (section 1) makes the stronger assertion that when n is large the relative error in the approximate proportionality rule is small.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Since ψ has compact support, it and all of its derivatives are uniformly continuous and uniformly bounded, and so the function v → Eψ(v + S n ) is differentiable with derivative Eψ ′ (v + S n ). Consequently, by the mean value theorem, for every u there existsṽ(u) intermediate between 0 and v(u) such that
We will argue that for all C > 0 sufficiently small, if |v(u)| ≤ C then the expectation Eψ ′ (ṽ(u) + S n ) remains below ǫ in absolute value, provided n is sufficiently large. Proposition 3.4 will then imply that there exists C ′ < ∞ such that (3) holds for all u ∈ (−A, B) at distance greater than C ′ n −3/2 from the endpoints −A, B, proving the first assertion of Theorem 3.
, by the necessary condition (12). By Proposition 3.6, if C < ∆, where ∆ is the discontinuity threshold, then v(u) is continuous on any interval [0, u C ] where |v(u)| ≤ C, and so for each u in this interval there is a u ′ ∈ [0, u] such thatṽ(u) = v(u ′ ). Consequently, |Eψ(ṽ(u) + S n )| ≤ C/ max(A, B). But Lemma 3.8 implies that for any ǫ > 0, if C > 0 is sufficiently small then for all n and any Nash equilibrium v(u),
where |v(u)| ≤ C. Thus, the error in the approximation (39) will be small when n is large and |v(u)| < C, for u > 0. A similar argument applies for u ≤ 0.
Finally, suppose that v(u) is a Nash equilibrium with no discontinuities. By Proposition 3.4, for any C > 0 there exists C ′ < ∞ such that |v(u)| ≤ C/2 except at arguments u within distance C ′ /n 3/2 of one of the endpoints. Moreover, Proposition 3.9 implies that if C is sufficiently small then on any interval where |v(u)| ≤ C the function v is differentiable, with derivative v ′ (u) ≤ C ′′ for some constant C ′′ < ∞ not depending on n or on the particular Nash equilibrium. It then follows that
provided n is large. Since C > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small, it follows that v(u) must satisfy the proportionality relations (3) 
Consequences of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 puts strong constraints on the distribution of the vote total S n in a Nash equilibrium. According to Theorem 3, the approximate proportionality rule (3) holds for all u ∈ [−A, B] except those values u within distance Cn −3/2 of one of the endpoints −A, B.
Call such values extremists, and denote by G the event that the sample U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n co Moreover, for Nash equilibria with no discontinuities, (3) holds for all u ∈ [−A, B]. Thus, conditional on the event G (or, for continuous Nash equilibria, unconditionally) the random variables v(U i ) are (at least for sufficiently large n) bounded above and below by Eψ(S n )B and −Eψ(S n )A, and so Hoeffding's inequality [4] applies.
Corollary 3.10. Let G be the event that the sample U i contains no extremists. Then for all sufficiently large n and any Nash equilibrium v(u),
and for any Nash equilibrium with no discontinuities,
Theorem 3 also implies uniformity in the normal approximation to the distribution of S n , because the proportionality rule (3) guarantees that the ratio of the third moment to the 3/2 power of the variance of v(U i ) is uniformly bounded. Hence, by the Berry-Esseen theorem, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.11. There exists κ < ∞ such that for all sufficiently large n and any Nash equilibrium v(u), the vote total S n satisfies
Here Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Unbalanced populations:
The case µ U > 0
Concentration of the Vote Total
Proposition 4.1. If µ U > 0 then for all large n no Nash equilibrium v(u) has a discontinuity at a nonnegative value of u. Moreover, if µ U > 0 then for any ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large then in any Nash equilibrium the vote total S n must satisfy
Furthermore, there is a constant γ > 0 such that for any ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large and v(u) is a Nash equilibrium with no discontinuities, then
Proof. By Proposition 3.6, a Nash equilibrium v(u) can have no discontinuities at distance greater than Cn −3/2 of one of the endpoints −A, B. Agents with such utilities are designated extremists; the event G that the sample U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n contains no extremists has probability 1 − O(n −1/2 ).
By Theorem 3, any Nash equilibrium v(u) obeys the approximate proportionality rule (3) except in the extremist regime. The contribution of extremists to ES n is vanishingly small for large n, since P (G c ) = O(n −1/2 ) and |v| ≤ max( √ 2A, √ 2B). Consequently, (3) implies that for any ǫ > 0, if n is large then
Since µ U > 0, this implies that ES n ≥ 0 for all sufficiently large n.
Suppose now that ES n < δ − 2ǫ ′ for some small ǫ ′ > 0. If ǫ > 0 is sufficiently small relative to ǫ ′ then (44) implies that nEψ(S n )µ U ≤ δ − ǫ ′ /2. But then Hoeffding's inequality (40) (for this a weaker Chebyshev bound would suffice), together with the fact that P (G c ) ≤ Kn −1/2 , implies that
for large n. This is impossible, though, because we would then have
and since ψ is bounded away from 0 on any compact sub-interval of (−δ, δ) this contradicts the fact that nEψ(S n ) < δ − ǫ ′ /2. This proves that for all large n and all Nash equilibria, ES n ≥ δ − 2ǫ ′ .
Next suppose that ES n > δ + √ 2A + 2ǫ ′ , where ǫ ′ > 0. The proportionality rule (3) (applied with some ǫ > 0 small relative to ǫ ′ ) then implies that nEψ(S n ) > δ + √ 2A + ǫ ′ . Hence, by the Hoeffding inequality (40), there exists γ = γ(ǫ ′ ) > 0 such that
because on the event S n ≤ δ + √ 2A the sum S n must deviate from its expectation by more than nEψ(S n )ǫ ′ . Hence, for all
Thus, |v(−A)| must be vanishingly small, and so by Proposition 3.6 there can be no discontinuities in [−A, 0]. But this implies that the proportionality rule (3) holds for all u ∈ [−A, B − Cn −3/2 ], and so another application of Hoeffding's inequality (coupled with the observation that v(u)/u ≥ (1−ǫ)Eψ(S n ) holds for all u ∈ [−A, B] if v has no discontinuities at negative values of u) implies that
which is a contradiction. This proves assertion (i).
Since ES n is now bounded away from 0 and ∞, it follows as before that nEψ(S n ) is bounded away from 0 and ∞, and so the proportionality rule (3) implies that the conditional variance of S n given the event G is O(n −1 ). The assertion (ii) therefore follows from Chebyshev's inequality and the bound P (G c ) = O(n −1/2 ). Given (i) and (ii), we can now conclude that there can be no discontinuities at nonnegative values of u, because in view of Proposition 3.6, the monotonicity of Nash equilibria, and the necessary condition (12), this would entail that
which is incompatible with (i) and (ii).
Finally, if v is a Nash equilibrium with no discontinuities then Corollary 3.10 implies the exponential bound (iii).
Proof of Theorem 4
Proposition 4.1 implies that for large n the distribution of S n is concentrated near ES n , and ES n ≥ δ − ǫ. Hence, the expected utility payoff for an agent with u > 0 is near u, and so when n is large it would be sub-optimal for an agent with utility u near B to buy more than ǫ votes. Since the size of a discontinuity is bounded below, by Proposition 3.6, it follows that for large n no Nash equilibrium will have a discontinuity in [0, B].
If a Nash equilibrium had a discontinuity at some u < 0 it would have to occur within distance O(n −3/2 ) of the endpoint −A. Thus, since Nash equilibria are monotone, v(−A) ≤ −∆, by Proposition 3.6. By Proposition 4.1, the expected payoff to an agent with utility −A would then be bounded above by
provided n is sufficiently large. On the other hand, the expected payoff to such an agent buying 0 votes would be at least −A; since by hypothesis v 2 − Ψ(δ − v) is bounded below by a positive number ǫ ′ , if ǫ < ǫ ′ then buying v(−A) < −∆ would be suboptimal, contradicting the hypothesis that v is a Nash equilibrium. This proves that for large n, no Nash equilibrium can have a discontinuity.
It remains to show that in a Nash equilibrium the distribution of S n is, for large n, concentrated near δ. By Proposition 4.1, the distribution of S n is concentrated near ES n , and since no Nash equilibrium has a discontinuity the probability that |S n − ES n | ≥ ǫ is exponentially decaying in n. Consequently, if ES n were larger than δ + 2ǫ then Eψ(S n ) would also be exponentially decaying in n. But this would contradict the proportionality rule (3), as this would imply that Eψ(S n ) ≥ δn −1 for large n.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proposition 4.1 implies that for large n the distribution of S n must be highly concentrated near ES n in any Nash equilibrium, and for any ǫ > 0 there exists γ > 0 such that for any Nash equilibrium with no discontinuities,
Hence, if ES n > δ + ǫ then Eψ(S n ) < e −γn . But Proposition 3 asserts that if a Nash equilibrium v(u) has no discontinuities then the proportionality rule (3) holds for all u ∈ [−A, B], and so
contradicting the fact that ES n ≥ δ − ǫ. This proves that for large n, any Nash equilibrium v(u) with no discontinuities must satisfy ES n < δ + ǫ.
Suppose that ES n < α − 2ǫ for some ǫ > 0. If ǫ > 0 is sufficiently small, then for some ǫ ′ > 0 depending on ǫ,
Consequently, if ES n ≤ α − 2ǫ, then an agent with utility u ∈ [−A, −A + ǫ ′ ] purchasing α + ǫ − w votes would have expected payoff at least
This strictly dominates the expected payoff ≈ −AP {S n ≥ α − 3ǫ} for buying votes in accordance with the approximate proportionality rule (3). But any Nash equilibrium must satisfy the rule (3) except in the extremist regime, so we have a contradiction. This proves that for all sufficiently large n, in any Nash equilibrium we must have ES n > α − 2ǫ. It follows that for all sufficiently large n, every Nash equilibrium has a discontinuity. The discontinuity must be located within distance Cn −3/2 of the endpoint −A, by Proposition 3.6. Now suppose that ES n > α + 3ǫ. Then, by Hoeffding's inequality, P (S n ≤ α + 2ǫ | G) is exponentially small for large n. Furthermore, since (α, w) is the unique pair satisfying (4),
and so it would be suboptimal for an agent with utility value −A to buy more than α+2ǫ−δ votes. Clearly it would also be suboptimal to buy more than ∆ but no more than α + 2ǫ − δ votes, where ∆ is the discontinuity threshold (cf. Proposition 3.6), because this would leave the expected utility payoff below −A(1 − e −γn ). Consequently, if ES n > α + 3ǫ then for large n no Nash equilibrium would have a discontinuity; since we have shown that for large n every Nash equilibrium has a discontinuity it follows that ES n cannot exceed α + 3ǫ for large n. We have therefore proved that for any ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large then (a) every Nash equilibrium has a discontinuity in the extremist regime near −A; and (b) |ES n − α| < ǫ. Assertion (iv) of the theorem follows, by Proposition 4.1.
Let v(u) be a Nash equilibrium, and let u * be the rightmost point u * of discontinuity of v. Consider the strategy v(u) for an agent with utility value u < u * : since v is monotone, v(u) ≤ −∆. Moreover, the expected payoff for an agent with utility u must exceed the expected payoff under the alternative strategy of buying no votes. The latter expectation is approximately −A, because S n is highly concentrated near ES n > α−ǫ and so EΨ(S n ) ≈ 1. On the other hand, the expected payoff at u for an agent playing the Nash strategy v is approximately
Consequently, since (α, w) is the unique pair such that relations (4) hold, we must have
This proves assertion (ii).
That v has only a single point of discontinuity u * follows from the hypothesis (5). Recall (cf. Lemma 3.5) that if v is discontinuous at u then Eψ ′ (ṽ + S n ) = 2 for someṽ intermediate between the right and left limits v(u+) and v(u−). But any discontinuity u must occur within distance βn −3/2 of −A, and if u < u * then v(u) ≈ −α + w. Hence, since the distribution of S n is concentrated in a neighborhood of α,
and so by (5), for u ∈ [−A, u * ) there cannot be a valueṽ ∈ [v(u−), v(u+)] satisfying the necessary condition Eψ ′ (ṽ + S n ) = 2 for a discontinuity.
Finally, since u * must be within distance Cn −3/2 of −A, the conditional probability that there are at least two extremists in the sample U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n given that there is at least one is of order O(n −1/2 ). Consequently,
On the other hand, since ES n ≈ α, the proportionality rule (3) implies that nEψ(S n ) ≈ α. Therefore,
where γ is the unique solution of the equation α = γψ(w)f U (−A). This proves assertions (i) and (iii). 
Proof. The size of any discontinuity is bounded below by a positive constant ∆, by Proposition 3.6, so it suffices to prove the assertion (45). By Proposition 3.2, for any ǫ > 0 there exists γ = γ(ǫ) such that if n is sufficiently large then any Nash equilibrium v(u) satisfying v ∞ > ǫ must also satisfy |v(u)| ≤ γ/ √ n for all u not within distance ǫ of one of the endpoints −A, B. Hence, the approximate proportionality relation (3) implies that
for a suitable C = C(γ). Since v(u)/u is within a factor (1 + ǫ) ±1 of Eψ(S n ) for all u not within distance C ′ ǫ n −3/2 of −A or B, it follows from Chebyshev's inequality that for any α > 0 there exists β = β(α) such that
On the other hand, if v ∞ ≥ ǫ, then by the necessary condition (12), there is some u such that
Since S n is concentrated around ES n , it follows that ES n must be at bounded distance from v(u), and so the Berry-Esseen bound (42) implies that P {S n ∈ [−δ/2, δ/2]} is bounded below. But this in turn implies that Eψ(S n ) is bounded below, which for large n is impossible in view of (46). Thus, if n is sufficiently large then no Nash equilibrium v(u) can have v ∞ ≥ ǫ.
Proof of Theorem 7
The proof of Theorem 7 will use the Edgeworth expansion for the density of a sum of independent, identically distributed random variables (cf. Feller [2] , Ch. XVI, sec. 2, Th.
2). The relevant summands here are the random variables v(U i ), and since the function v(u) depends on the particular Nash equilibrium (and hence also on n), it will be necessary to have a version of the Edgeworth expansion in which the error is precisely quantified. The following variant of Feller's Theorem 2 (which can be proved in the same manner as in [2] ) will suffice for our purposes. 
Then there is a sequence ǫ n → 0 depending only on m 2r and on the function g such that the density
for all x ∈ R, where The following lemma ensures that in any Nash equilibrium the sums S n = n i=1 v(U i ), after suitable renormalization, meet the requirements of Theorem 8. The existence of the density f W (w) follows from the smoothness of Nash equilibria, which was established in section 3.4. In particular, by Proposition 3.9, inequalities (38), and the proportionality relations (3), if the sample size n is sufficiently large and v is any continuous Nash equilibrium then v is twice continuously differentiable on [−A, B], and there are constants α, β > 0 not depending on n or on the particular Nash equilibrium such that the derivatives satisfy
for all u ∈ [−A, B]. Consequently, if U is a random variable with density f U (u) then the random variable W := 2v(U )/Eψ(S n ) has density
Furthermore, the density f W (w) is continuously differentiable, and its derivative
where κ < ∞ is a constant that does not depend on either n or on the choice of Nash equilibrium.
It remains to prove the existence of a dominating function g(θ) for the Fourier transform of f W . This will be done in three pieces: (i) for values |θ| ≤ γ, where γ > 0 is a small fixed constant; (ii) for values |θ| ≥ K, where K is a large but fixed constant; and (iii) for γ < |θ| < K. Region (i) is easily dealt with, in view of the bounds (a)-(b) on the second and third moments and the estimate |Ew(U )| < ǫ ′ , as these together with Taylor's theorem imply that for all |θ| < 1,
Next consider region (ii), where |θ| is large. Integration by parts shows that
; since f W (w) is uniformly bounded at w(−A) and w(B), by (49) and (50), and since |f ′ W (w)| ≤ κ, by (51), it follows that there is a constant C < ∞ such that for all sufficiently large n and all Nash equilibria,
Thus, setting g(θ) = C/|θ| for all |θ| ≥ 2C, we have a uniform bound for the Fourier transformsf W (θ) in the region (ii).
Finally, to bound |f W (θ)| in the region (iii) of intermediate θ−values, we use the proportionality rule once again to deduce that |w(u) − u| < ǫ. Therefore,
where |R(θ)| < ǫ ′ uniformly for |θ| ≤ C and ǫ ′ → 0 as ǫ → 0. Sincef U is the Fourier transform of an absolutely continuous probability density, its absolute value is bounded away from 1 on the complement of [−γ, γ], for any γ > 0. Since ǫ > 0 can be made arbitrarily small (cf. Proposition 3), it follows that there is a continuous, positive function g(θ) that is bounded away from 1 on
The extension of g to the whole real line can now be done by smoothly interpolating at the boundaries of regions (i), (ii), and (iii).
Proof of Theorem 7.
We have already observed, in the proof of Lemma 5.2, that for any ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large then for any Nash equilibrium, |Ew(U )| < ǫ. It therefore follows from the proportionality rule that
Moreover, Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 8 imply that the distribution of S n has a density with an Edgeworth expansion, and so for any continuous function ϕ supported by [−δ, δ], with
where y = y(x) = (x − ES n )/ var(S n ) and P k (y) = C k H k (y) is a multiple of the kth Hermite polynomial. The constants C k depend only on the first k moments of w(U ), and consequently are uniformly bounded by constants C ′ k not depending on n or on the choice of Nash equilibrium. The error term r n (ϕ) satisfies
The strategy of the proof will be to show that for every ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large then for every Nash equilibrium,
It will then follows that in the expansion (53) the lead term dominates (because the integral will range over values of x for which |y(x)| ≤ ǫ), and so for large n, with ϕ = ψ,
proving the assertion (7).
Proof of (55). We will first argue that Eψ(S n ) cannot be of smaller order of magnitude than n −1 . Fix C > 0, and suppose that Eψ(S n ) ≤ Cn −1 . Then by the proportionality rule (3) and equation (12), for any ǫ > 0 and all sufficiently large n
Thus, by Hoeffding's inequality (Corollary 3.10), the distribution of S n must be highly concentrated in a neighborhood of 0. But if this were so we would have, for all large n,
which is a contradiction. This proves that for large n any Nash equilibrium must satisfy
It now follows from (52) that var(S n ) ≥ C 2 σ 2 U n −1 , and so by (54),
Consequently, the error term r n (ϕ) in the Edgeworth expansion (53) is of smaller order of magnitude than n −3/2 Eψ(S n ). This proves inequality (55).
It follows, in particular, that the error in the expansion (53) for ϕ = ψ, is negligible, and hence for sufficiently large n every Nash equilibrium satisfies
U for large n, this implies that for a suitable constant κ < ∞,
Proof of (56).
Inequality (56) could fail in one of two ways:
, and so by (52), Eψ(S n ) 2 ≤ 32δ 2 σ 2 U /(nǫ 2 ), at least for sufficiently large n. But in order that Eψ(S n ) be this small, it would be necessary that |ES n | be large, because otherwise the Edgeworth expansion (53) with ϕ = ψ would imply that Eψ(S n ) is of order 1. Consequently, the inequality 2δ ≥ ǫ var(S n ) would imply that |ES n | ≥ δ. This shows that to prove (56) it suffices to prove that for any ǫ > 0 if n is suffices large,
Recall again the necessary condition 2v(u) = Eψ(v(u) + S n )u for a Nash equilibrium; since ψ is infinitely differentiable and has compact support, the expectation can be expanded in a Taylor series:
whereṽ(u) is a point intermediate between 0 and v(u). Since EU = 0, the expectation of the k = 0 term in (61) is 0, and so
To complete the proof of inequality (60) we will bound each of the two terms on the right side of (62) separately. The easier of the two terms is the second, so we dispose of it first.
and so if Eψ(S n ) ≤ C ′′ / √ n then |Eψ ′′ (S n )Eψ(S n )Eψ ′ (ṽ(U ) + S n )v(U )U 3 | ≤ Cρǫ n Eψ(S n ) 2 ≤ C ′′′′ ǫ n Eψ(S n )/ √ n and
This proves that for any ǫ > 0, if n is large then
Together with inequality (64), this implies (63).
First order term.
Our analysis of the second-order term in the expansion (62) proves that for any ǫ > 0 if n is sufficiently large then
Consequently, to prove (60), it will suffice to show that for any ǫ > 0 if n is sufficiently large then Eψ ′ (S n )E(v(U )U ) ≤ ǫEψ(S n )/ √ n if Ev(U ) > 0, and
Now v(U )U ≥ 0 and |v(U )| ≤ 2(A ∨ B)Eψ(S n ), so it will suffice to prove that for any ǫ > 0 if n is large then Eψ ′ (S n ) ≤ 1/n 1/2+ǫ if Ev(U ) > 0 and (66) Eψ ′ (S n ) ≥ −1/n 1/2+ǫ if Ev(U ) < 0 .
Assume that Ev(U ) > 0; the opposite case can be handled in the same manner. To establish the inequality (66) we will use the Edgeworth series (53) with φ = ψ ′ . By inequality (58), the error term in the Edgeworth expansion (53) for Eψ ′ (S n ) is bounded by a constant multiple of ǫ n ψ ′ 1 /n 5/2 , and hence this error can be ignored. The dominant term in the Edgeworth expansion (53) is
where y = y(x) = ((x−ES n )/ var(S n )). If Ev(U ) > 0 then ES n > 0 and so exp{−y(x) 2 /2} is an increasing function on [−δ, δ]. But ψ ′ (x) is an odd function of x that is negative for x > 0; consequently, if Ev(U ) > 0 then the dominant term is negative. (Similarly, if Ev(U ) < 0 then the dominant term is positive.) Therefore, to prove the inequality (66) it suffices to show that the higher-order terms 3 ≤ k ≤ 8 in the Edgeworth expansion are bounded in absolute value by n −1/2+ǫ .
The k = 3 term in (53) is
where P 3 (y) = C 3 H 3 (y) and H 3 (x) = x 3 − x is the third Hermite polynomial. The constant C k is a continuous function of the first three moments of w(U ), which by (52) are uniformly bounded. Since the function H 3 (y)e −y 2 /2 is bounded on R, and since σ V ≈ σ U Eψ(S n )/2, by (52), it follows that for a suitable constant κ < ∞, if n is sufficiently large then
The terms 4 ≤ k ≤ 8 in the expansion (53) can be bounded in similar fashion:
Thus, if Eψ(S n ) ≥ n −1/2+2ǫ then the bound (66) will hold for all large n.
It remains to prove that (66) remains valid when Eψ(S n ) ≤ n −1/2+2ǫ , and since the dominant term in the Edgeworth expansion is negative when Ev(U ) > 0, it suffices to consider the terms T k for 3 ≤ k ≤ 8. Consider the Edgeworth expansion for Eψ(S n ):
ψ(x)e −y 2 /2 1 + 8 k=3 n −(k−2)/2 P k (y) dx + r n (ψ).
Since Eψ(S n ) ≥ Cn −1 , by (57), and since ψ ≥ 0, the terms 3 ≤ k ≤ 8 and the remainder term are of smaller order of magnitude than the dominant term, and so for large n,
ψ(x)e −y 2 /2 dx ≥ (C/4)n −1 .
Hence, since ψ is even and e −y 2 /2 is monotone in x on x ∈ [−δ, δ], there exists constants 0 < C ′ < C ′′ such that for all large n,
This implies that |y(x)| ≤ C ′′′ √ log n for all x ∈ [−δ, δ] (since nσ V is bounded below), and so for an appropriate constant C * , |P k (y)| ≤ C * (log n) 4 for each 3 ≤ k ≤ 8 and x ∈ [−δ, δ]
where P k (y) are the polynomials in the Edgeworth expansion (53). Therefore, for each 3 ≤ k ≤ 8,
for all sufficiently large n. This proves (66). 
Proof. It suffices to prove this for intervals of length δ, because any interval of length nδ can be partitioned into n pairwise disjoint intervals each of length δ. Without loss of generality, EY 1 = 0 and δ = 1 (if not, translate and re-scale). Let g be a nonnegative, even, C ∞ function with g ∞ = 1 that takes the value 1 on [− Since g is C ∞ and has compact support, its Fourier transform is real-valued and integrable, so the Fourier inversion theorem implies that Eg(S n + x) = 1 2π ĝ(θ)ϕ(−θ) n e −iθx dθ, where ϕ(θ) = Ee iθY 1 is the characteristic function of Y 1 . Because EY 1 = 0, the derivative of the characteristic function at θ = 0 is 0, and hence ϕ has Taylor expansion
Consequently, if the hypotheses (67) hold then for any γ > 0, if n is sufficiently large,
for all |θ| ≤ γ. This implies (since |ĝ| ≤ 2) that Eg(S n + x) ≤ 1 π |θ|<γ e −β 2 θ 2 /4 dθ + 1 2π |θ|≥γ |ĝ(θ)| dθ
Sinceĝ is integrable, the constant γ can be chosen so that the second integral is less that ǫ/2, and if β is sufficiently large then the first integral will be bounded by ǫ/2.
